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We live in a world in which the specific form our bodies take 
very much matters; sex, race, physical anomalies, and any physically 
marked differences from or convergence with the dominant "norm" have 
ramifications that extend into every part of our: lives. Not all corporeal 
differences are equally significant. Whether I have brown or black eyes 
does not matter as much as whether my skin is black or white. In addition, 
corporeal differences that are perhaps less tangible since they are not ge-
netically determined - the way one carries oneself, the way one speaks, 
behaviors that betray one's class -can also have a deeply pervasive im-
pact which is difficult to escape and which forms an inevitable part of the 
fabric of one's life. Whatever one's politics or beliefs about what it means 
to be human, the specific body one inhabits inevitably affects the path 
one's life takes. Our bodies have social significance with which we are 
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forced to come to terms. They enter into our senses of identity, the ways 
we behave, and the ways we interact with others. To theorize the body, 
then, means in part to refuse to ignore this aspect of social existence on 
the misguided assumption that we interact as if we were all equally human 
and that what this means is not inextricably linked with the specific forms 
our bodies take. 
That said, however, it is tricky to know how to take this body into ac-
count. Do we assume that anyone who is female has one kind of body and 
that anyone who is male has another? Do we assume that race is clearly de-
marcated in specific ways? How do we theorize this body, how do we ac-
count for its role in subjectivity, how do we account for its effects? How do 
we account for how and when it enters into our own senses of identity as 
well as the way it enters into how others perceive and treat us? Lately there 
has been some very interesting work done on the body by feminists as well 
as many others. 1 Western culture tends to associate women with the body 
in a reductionistic way that makes women seem somehow less than 
human; feminists have explored this assumption by exploring the connec-
tion between human "nature" and embodiment. If women are more iden-
tified with their bodies than men with theirs, why is this the case, and is it 
really because women are less able to reason beyond the contingencies of 
the flesh and the impermanence of sensuous existence? 
Despite the association of women with the body, it is by no means an 
area of life that philosophers have entirely neglected. Hegel and Marx em-
phasize the role of human labor in the development of consciousness, 
Husser! and Heidegger return to the lived experience of perception to 
ground philosophy, and Nietzsche and Freud claim that the body and the 
physiological aspects of living are crucial to human consciousness in ways 
of which we may not be aware. More recently, theorists of various disci-
plines have attempted to theorize the body itself. Psychoanalysis has con-
tinued to develop accounts of conscious experience as it emerges from the 
initial corporeal organization of the subject in relation to her or his par-
ents. Literary theorists, historians, sociologists, anthropologists, and 
philosophers have also tried to account for the variety of ways in which the 
human body has been represented over the centuries and to theorize its 
significance for human life. 
In her groundbreaking book Volatile Bodies, Elizabeth Grosz presents a 
compelling agenda for an approach to the body that would provide new in-
sight into the puzzles of various kinds of dualisms in the philosophical tra-
dition as well as into alternative conceptions of subjectivity, gender rela-
tions, and the relationship of self to other. According to Grosz, traditional 
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approaches to the body include investigating the body as an object of the 
natural sciences, construing it as a kind of tool of consciousness (or aves-
sel occupied by an "animating, willful subjectivity"), or conceiving of it as 
a passive medium of expression that renders communicable what is essen-
tially private (Grosz 1994c, 8). All these approaches imply a mind/body 
dualism. Theories that reduce human consciousness to physiological pro-
cesses, as well as those that depict consciousness as either a disembodied 
process or the effect of a mental thing, fail to capture the ambiguity of 
human existence. Human beings come to experience the world as con-
scious, sentient, embodied subjects through a process in which no clear 
distinctions can be made between mind and body, thought and matter, 
reason and emotion, interiority and exteriority, or self and other. 
Philosophy has tended to replicate the mind/body dualism by elevating 
a disembodied mind and disavowing the body. In addition, it has excluded 
the feminine by implicitly coding it as aligned with the unreason associ-
ated with the body. Grosz suggests that to overcome the blind spot created 
by the refusal of the body and the feminine, philosophers should regard 
the body "as the threshold· or borderline concept that hovers perilously 
and undecidably at the pivotal point of binary pairs" (Grosz 1994c, 2 3). 
That is, rather than revalorizing the body as the unprivileged term of the 
various dichotomies with which it is associated, she suggests theorizing the 
body as a unique kind of object which problematizes binary oppositions. 
She evokes the metaphor of a Mobius strip to model "the inflection of 
mind into body and body into mind" and the "ways in which, through a 
kind of twisting or inversion, one side becomes another." It is the body 
viewed as this kind of peculiar object that is neither simply a psychical in-
terior nor a corporeal exterior but something with a kind of "uncontrol-
lable drift of the inside into the outside and the outside into the inside" 
(xii) that would provide a perspective from which to rethink the opposi-
tion between inside and outside, private and public, self and other, as well 
as other binary pairs associated with the mind/body opposition (2 1). 
Confronting the ambiguity of the body entails questioning the "nat-
ural" coherence and solidity of bodies and complicates our understanding 
of the social identities "attached" to those bodies. If bodies are not corpo-
real containers for consciousness but are instead fully implicated in the dy-
namic process of social living, then our tendency to consider our bodies 
the preserve of the "natural" part of our identities is false. Our embodied 
selves are as implicated in our specific historical situation as the social 
selves of our conscious experience. This means that there can be no easy 
distinction between body and mind; the notion of a body with determinate 
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boundaries, just like the notion of a psychic self, is the constituted effect of 
. dynamic forces which are always in movement. 
With the "linguistic turn" toward philosophical questions about the 
nature of language and the discursive subjectivity of language users, theo-
rists of various kinds have elaborated how human subjects are implicated 
in systems of signification. At times this work has tended toward, or been 
read as tending toward, a conception of the human subject that is socially 
situated only with respect to the abstract signifers of a system of social 
significance.2 Such accounts tend to drop out the embodied subject in 
order to concentrate on the speaking subject who is able to situate herself 
within the matrix of linguistic systems of meaning. An important aspect 
of human subjectivity is one's situatedness within symbolic systems and 
one's ability to produce words that will be recognized by others as the 
words of a subject who "makes sense." Julia Kristeva, Michel Foucault, 
Luce Irigaray, Gilles Deleuze, and Felix Guattari have created theories of 
subjectivity that emphasize the implication of such discursive situatedness 
in corporeal practices that are equally situated and yet entail an extralin-
guistic dimension of meaning. Their work provides some of the exciting 
approaches toward conceptions of humanity that are able to account for 
"the inflection of mind into body and body into mind" which Grosz has 
in mind. The conception of the human subject which emerges from their 
work is that of a problematic intertwining of contingent and often con-
flicting social identities assumed at the level of imaginary identifications 
involving a morphology of the body (that is, an ongoing materialization of 
the body in the specific forms that it takes), as well as at the level of con-
scious thought. The body of such a subject is not a stable entity with un-
ambiguous boundaries, but a temporal becoming which is always cultur-
ally mediated and integrally linked to the equally dynamic process of 
psychic selfhood. 
In this book I focus in particular on the work oflrigaray and of Deleuze, 
sometimes in collaboration with Guattari, in order to engage in a project of 
overcoming mind/body dualisms which have been detrimental to women 
as well as other "marginalized" groups, and in order to elaborate a vocabu-
lary for talking about ourselves in relation to the world and human others 
in terms of the dynamic flow of a process of being that is corporeal 
as well as discursive. I approach this project from a perspective informed 
by feminist writers who, like Grosz, call for an account of how the body 
comes into play in the production of the lmowledges that inform our self-
understanding and our conceptions of what is desirable as well as what is 
possible for human relationships and ethical community; but it is from Iri-
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garay's work that I derive the main inspiration for the form my project 
takes.3 
Irigaray argues that contemporary culture is bifurcated by a sexual divi-
sion oflabor in which the body and the "natural" are relegated to the fem-
inine and the more "cultural" products of symbolic significance are rele-
gated to the masculine. She further argues that this bifurcation has serious 
ethical implications which have led to an impoverished life for us all and 
have encouraged us to create symbolic support for feminine subjectivity. 
Such support would make possible a genuine dialogue between two kinds 
of subjects. Genuine communication between two genders could lead to 
undermining the body/mind bifurcation of contemporary culture, foster 
practices of perception in which all subjects took responsibility for inte-
grating body and mind, and open up important ethical and political op-
portunities for a new way of life. In this book I develop Irigaray's account 
of a (masculinist) specular economy of subjectivity which fosters divisive 
mind/body dualisms, and I explore Irigaray's work, along with the work of 
Deleuze, to develop a theory of embodied subjectivity that could provide 
an alternative to contemporary forms of specular subjectivity. Deleuze ar-
gues that we need to encourage experimentation with nomadic subjectiv-
ity. Human life is organized into strata which are implicated with nonhu-
man strata of life. Nomadic subjects can destratify from rigid forms of 
organization by creating "planes of consistency" that put heterogeneous 
elements of existence into continuous variation. I appeal to Deleuze's 
reading of Foucault to highlight how nomadic subjects can integrate dis-
cursive and nondiscursive aspects of social life. Deleuze's work provides an 
important resource for characterizing how subjects can foster creative en-
gagement with the world of dynamic becoming of which they are an inte-
gral part. I elaborate Irigaray's theory of specular subjectivity as a useful 
description of some aspects of contemporary social life. Understanding 
ourselves through such a description could suggest alternative ways of 
being. Thorizing those alternatives, on my view, constitutes a positive step 
in making them a reality. 
Because terms such as 'human nature', 'self', 'woman', and 'man' imply 
static substances (with or without changing attributes), they fail to capture 
the dynamic quality of the process of being-subject these theorists empha-
size. Although the terminology used to describe this process is by no 
means uniform, various writers have contributed new terms for that pro-
cess as well as new ways of understanding more traditional designations for 
human selfhood. I use the term 'subject' to refer to a grammatical position 
the 'I' can take up with respect to conventional meaning and 'self' to refer 
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to the reference point or image by which a human being can orient the de-
veloping narrative of her life. Since the self of a narrative seems to take on 
a specific form by accruing qualities and characteristics in the living of a 
life, 'subject' seems to be the more appropriate term for indicating a social 
self in the context of positioning itself vis-a-vis a larger social field that is 
importantly oriented thi-ough language as well as other systems of social 
significance. 'Subjectivity' refers to the notion of the subject as a process 
that must continually repeat itself in order to maintain a specific form and 
an 'economy' or 'structuring' of subjectivity to the various means by which 
a subject can regulate and stabilize this process of being a subject. 
Grosz has described the project of Luce Irigaray as that of "rethinking 
knowledges as the products of sexually specific bodies" (Grosz 1995, 41). 
Irigaray demonstrates through readings of key philosophical texts that the 
supposedly sexually indifferent status ofknowledges (i.e., their claims to be 
universal rather than the product of masculine interests) is linked with a 
"culturally inscribed correlation of men with the category of mind and of 
women with the category of body." It is due to the association of women 
with the body, the irrational, and the natural that men can take on the po-
sition of subjects of "pure" knowledge: "By positioning women as the 
body, they can project themselves and their products as disembodied, pure, 
and uncontaminated" (42 ). It is the project of this book to investigate ways 
of overcoming the detrimental impact of mind/body dualisms that privi-
lege the former at the expense of the latter. In keeping with this project, I 
introduce the terms 'conceptual logics' and 'corporeal logics' to mark the 
pervasive impact of such dualisms in contemporary culture. Both Irigaray 
and Deleuze challenge any conception of the human subject as a unified, 
rational agent and instead theorize subjectivity as the effect of a dynamic 
process involving heterogeneity and difference which includes corporeal as 
well as psychic elements. They challenge conventional notions of percep-
tion which assume that objects of perception are similar to other objects 
perceived in the past, as well as notions of conception which assume that 
objects of thought must conform to already established norms. Both chal'-
lenge the traditional model of thinking and instead theorize thinking as al-
ways encountering what is singular and unprecedented. I follow Irigaray 
and Deleuze in conceiving of philosophizing as a practice - one that does 
not necessarily give clear-cut results, but one that sets us on a path of ex-
perimentation and receptivity to the unknown. Questions concerning the 
body, its relationship to mind, and the nature of embodied subjectivity 
lead each of them to a critique of traditional notions of identity and repre-
sentational thought. For both, the body and the self are not the contained 
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objects they may appear to be, but are rather the effects of processes of 
which we are more or less unaware. Investigating these processes enables 
us to rethink our engagement with them and instigate new experiences in 
embodied living. 
In keeping with the challenge of their theories to traditional notions of 
the body as well as of the mind, I use the term 'corporeal logics' to refer to 
the background processes informing the perceptual awareness of sensation 
and what are traditionally known as the "irrational" processes of mood, in-
tuitive "gut" feelings, and emotions, and I use the term 'conceptual logics' 
to refer to the background processes informing the conceptual awareness 
of what are traditionally known as the "rational" processes of logical and 
articulate thought. Referring to both sides of the mind/body dualism in 
terms of a logic underlines the socially situated nature of such logics and 
the insight that "natural" bodies are as informed by social processes as are 
minds. Maintaining a distinction between the two through the use of the 
two terms underlines the pervasive cultural bifurcation Irigaray insists 
upon, which relegates products of the "mind" to one group in society and 
products of the "body" to the other. Although I am not as convinced as 
Irigaray that gender is the only or even the most important way to mark 
the groups associated with these dualisms, I believe she is right to insist 
that theorizing the mechanisms of this dualism is crucial to our struggles 
to create a more ethical future. 
Distinguishing corporeal and conceptual logics speaks to the way in 
which contemporary meaning systems are arranged in keeping with 
mind/body dualisms; we actually do tend to separate our understanding of 
life according to this split.4 What we know on a rational, cerebral level is 
not what we know on an emotional, corporeal level. The gap between a 
subject's conceptual and corporeal logics can be profound since the realms 
of conceptual and corporeal "sense" not only are oriented in different di-
rections but are also likely to diverge ever more widely, especially in a cul-
ture that emphasizes mind/body dualisms. Both Irigaray and Deleuze are 
engaged in a project of transforming how we think, speak, and live. In the · 
reading I give here of their work, I emphasize how this transformation in-
volves reconnecting our bodies and minds at the corporeal level as well as 
at the level of discursive systems of meaning and note the beneficial effects 
the integration of what we might call somatic knowledge with conceptual 
knowledge could have for a culture intent on valorizing the latter at the 
expense of the former. 
My exploration of the body is in part a response to the sense of alien-
ation that seems to pervade contemporary cultural life and that was so 
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compellingly diagnosed by Nietzsche. Nietzsche taunts the person who 
thinks that his self is just his consciousness or rational capacity. For Nietz-
sche, this part of the self is just the "little self" - a small effect of a much 
larger self that is "the body." In denying this larger self, we not only deny 
the greater part of who we are but also close off possibilities of living. This 
larger self turns out to be the effect of natural and social forces extending 
beyond us that only contingently converge to manifest a given individual. 
This Nietzschean theme is picked up by Heidegger, Irigaray, and Deleuze. 
The work of Irigaray and Deleuze emerges from a French philosophical 
tradition marked by the Cartesian influence which led to a specifically 
French reaction to Hegel, Husser!, and Heidegger as well as Nietzsche, 
Marx, and Freud.5 Heidegger's interest in Nietzsche prompted a French 
resurgence of interest in Nietzsche.6 Whatever their disagreements with 
this tradition - Irigaray's break with the Lacanian community or De-
leuze's insistence on doing his commentaries on "maverick" philosophers 
such as Nietzsche, Spinoza, and Bergson rather than Descartes, Hegel, 
and Heidegger- the questions and issues that emerge in their work bear 
the marks of that tradition. 
To set the scene for my reading oflrigaray and Deleuze, I briefly present 
the role of the body in Heidegger's work in the next section of this intro-
duction. I am interested in why he seems to draw back from what we might 
call "body'' talk despite his insistence on our Being-in-the-world. I also ex-
plore his notion of following the path of genuine thinking. I claim that this 
path entails integrating corporeal logics with conceptual logics and so en-
gages one in what we might call a corporeal practice of thinking. Irigaray's 
and Deleuze's projects, different as they are, both involve a shift in thinking 
that must take place on a corporeal as well as a conceptual level. Reading 
Irigaray and Deleuze in light of the notion of thinking as an integrative 
practice meant to bring about a transformation in corporeal morphology as 
well as cognitive understanding provides an approach to their work that has 
provocative implications for reconceiving ethical self-other relations. 
In the final section I motivate a project that would foster a way of think-
ing, speaking, and being that integrates conceptual thought with corporeal 
logic, and I briefly sketch out the resonances between Irigaray and De-
leuze in light of such a project. 
Heidegger aad the Body 
Heidegger's notions of curiosity, idle talk, and ambiguity in Being and 
Time are interesting when examined in light of the discursive notion of 
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subjectivity that emerges in poststructuralist accounts of human selfhood. 
Saussurean linguistics, Levi-Straussian anthropology, Lacanian psycho-
analysis, and Foucauldian notions of the subject could be read as indicating 
that human subjects are the effects of social systems of significance that re-
quire human beings to take up a position as a speaking subject with respect 
to other social subjects. The specific form that one's subjectivity takes 
would then be contingent on how one's position in the larger structural 
whole of human significance relates to other possible positions. The no-
tions of curiosity, idle talk, and ambiguity which Heidegger delineates in 
Being and Time refer to the ease with which a speaker of language can take 
up perspectives with respect to what it is possible to say. His interpretation 
of these notions suggests that one can take up such a perspective without 
seriously considering the choices involved in thus positioning oneself. 
When one is curious in a superficial way, engaged in idle talk, or deliber-
ately ambiguous rather than taking a stand, one is adopting a free-floating 
attitude that can easily shift. There is no resistance or friction in such 
shifts; one moves easily from one attitude to the next. Even those obstacles 
set up by cultural mores and taboos do not have to be respected in idle 
talk. One's actual social position or locatedness can be waived without loss 
of "meaning" at the level of public discourse. That is, one can engage in 
many forms of conversation with others without having to confront one's 
own situation as an embodied human being (Heidegger 1962, «Jl35-38). 
On Heidegger's account, relating to one's own death brings one back to 
one's own embodiment and the physical limitations of being in time and 
space - and in particular a specific culturally encoded time and space. 
Confronting one's mortality means, in part, confronting the disintegration 
of one's bodily boundaries. When one dies, one will not only no longer 
have possibilities in the sense of having a position in a cultural matrix; one 
will also no longer have sentient experience. On the one hand, Heideg-
ger's Dasein (his term for human existence) has possibilities that "make 
sense" in relation to the meaning systems of a specific society. On the 
other, insofar as Dasein is living "authentically," possibilities are mani-
fested within the constraints presented by a uniquely embodied situation. 
Authenticity, then, insists on a kind of situatedness that involves both the 
discursive meanings of a cultural field of significance and the corporeal ex-
periences of an embodied subject. 
Dasein as Being-in-the-world is always projecting itself toward a future 
about which it cares. The 'they' - Heidegger's term for public discourse 
which dictates what "one" should do in a given situation- provides Da-
sein with a range of meaningful cultural projects from which to choose. 
lnlndHIIIR 9 
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Projects that do not fully engage the Dasein living them out are inauthen-
tic. Heidegger's uncanny "call" of conscience which prompts "authentic" 
commitment to one's choices (as opposed to the evasive irresponsibility of 
someone who views her choices from the perspective of, for example, idle 
talk) could be read as a call to attend to the corporeal logic of the body. 7 
Conscience summons Dasein's Self from its lostness in the "they." The 
Self to which the appeal is made remains indefinite and empty in its 
"what." When Dasein interprets itself in terms of that with which it 
concerns itself, the call passes over what Dasein, proximally and for the 
most part, understands itself as. And yet the Self has been reached, un-
equivocally and unmistakably .... The caller is unfamiliar to the every-
day they-self; it is something like an alien voice. What could be more 
alien to the "they," lost in the manifold 'world' of its concern, than the 
Self which has been individualized down to itself in uncanniness and 
been thrown into the "nothing"? (Heidegger 1962, 317-22, '1I56) 
The call away from the 'they' could be conceived as a call toward a hetero-
geneous logic that speaks of the dynamic formations of a body in process. 
To turn away from this call is to turn away from what moves us at the level 
of bodily fluxes and flows - the fleeting sensations, emotions, and half-
thoughts of the more decidely corporeal aspects of human selves. This call 
is reticent and silent in the sense that it does not and cannot utilize the 
same logics as those of language. The call summons Dasein away from the 
public discourse of the 'they,' because the same things that are meaningful 
to the subject at the symbolic level of conventional social significance are 
not necessarily meaningful at the level of that subject's corporeal logic. 
Different words evoke emotional resonance in keeping with an experien-
tial fund of encoded experience which relates to the biography of the indi-
vidual. This biography has both corporeal and conceptual components. 
Authenticity involves an integrative act of bringing together the two levels 
of corporeal and conceptual meaning in a vitalizing way. It thus adds an 
emotional richness to authentic living that the dispersed living of inau-
thentic life cannot have. 
Heidegger's notion of mood indicates the corporeal rootedness of the 
prereflective understanding more primordial than our theoretical under-
standing of life. The 'they' cannot dictate Dasein's mood. Anxiety is explic-
itly analyzed by Heidegger as a mood that speaks to the ultimate lack of dis-
cursive foundation for any specific project Dasein may choose (Heidegger 
1962, 'Jl4o). Heidegger's notion of the call could thus be read as a call tore-
think our engagements with the projects that are meaningful to us because 
1 o lrtgaray and lelme 
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of the 'they' in a way that incorporates direction from the corporeal logics 
of an embodied subject who has had to develop a determinate physical form 
as well as a psychic self. Heidegger's mystification of the gap between the 
'they' and the uncanny call pulling one away from the 'they' could be the 
first step toward the reactionary suggestion to uphold the "destiny'' of one's 
traditional culture, for example, as manifested by the Nazi Party ofHeideg-
ger's cultural situation; such mystification tends to leave only the already ar-
ticulated possibilities of the tradition as opportunities for authentic action. 
Developing a richer vocabulary for corporeal processes might provide sym-
bolic support for creative integration of corporeal and conceptual logics 
that could generate new choices in authentic living. 
We will find that Irigaray and Deleuze also appeal to silence for creative 
rejuvenation. Irigaray advocates listening to silence (see Chapter 4). De-
leuze advocates approaching the gap between mute word and blind thing 
that intimates something beyond both corporeal and conceptual logics 
(see Chapter 8). Irigaray's feminine subject is receptive to the sensible 
transcendental. This transcendental is immanent in all sensous experience 
and yet is transcendent in the sense of eluding any determinate form expe-
rience takes. Deleuze's nomadic subject is receptive to the imperceptible. 
The imperceptible is also immanent in conscious experience; molecular 
becomings occur at thresholds below the level of the perceivable and con-
ceivable and yet can set into motion new formations of both. Irigaray's 
sensible transcendental opens subjectivity to a feminine divine which is a 
horizon of dynamic becoming. Deleuze's becoming-imperceptible opens 
subjectivity to a virtual chaos of incompossible becoming. A practice of 
thinking that entails integrating corporeal and conceptual logics entails, 
for Irigaray and Deleuze as well as Heidegger, receptivity to an immanent 
"beyond" in which binary oppositions no longer hold. 
One of the theses of this book is that we can and should attempt to 
theorize more of the corporeal aspect of being human into conscious 
awareness. An elaboration of corporeal logics could provide a vocabulary 
of the body that would allow us to symbolize and integrate more of the 
extralinguistic realm of embodied living into our consciousness. Since 
symbolizing corporeal logics must always pursue a dynamic process, such 
a project would entail the transformation of Western representational 
thought into another, perhaps more life-affirming, form of thought. 
Heidegger, like Irigaray and Deleuze, suggests that thinking, speaking, 
and writing can and should involve something like a transformative prac-
tice. None of these thinkers are interested in thinking and writing prac-
tices that merely pass along information. They are all looking for some 
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kind of qualitative change in the lived experience of their readers as well 
as in themselves. One way that this is expressed is through an emphasis 
on the path of thinking, or the process of reading, speaking, and writing, 
as opposed to the results produced in the content of the thinker's 
thought. They direct our attention to thinking and writing as practices 
with transformative possibilities rooted in material processes not all of 
which are accessible to conscious awareness. Focusing attention on these 
processes through the notion of the body, rather than the notions of the 
unconscious or of Being, has the advantage of calling our attention to the 
fringes of our own awareness. It emphasizes the potential accessibility of 
these processes without at the same time minimizing their strangeness or 
the bizarre effects they could have on what it is that we think we already 
know.8 
Conceptual Tltought and Corporeal logics 
The Freudian notion of drives suggests that they are neither completely 
biological nor completely cUltural. Thus, for psychoanalytic theory, and 
particularly Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, the body can provide a kind 
of link between soma and psyche, the place where body and mind meet. 
That theorizing this link turns out to problematize the distinction be-
tween body and mind does not diminish its importance for understanding 
how the body/mind distinction emerges. One could argue that Heidegger 
attempts to overcome mind/body dualisms but reintroduces one by privi-
leging a radically other "call" stripped of its corporeal roots in material 
process. Irigaray stresses the importance of acknowledging and represent-
ing sexual difference in a cultural economy that aligns matter-nature-body 
with the feminine and divinity-culture-mind with the masculine. Deleuze 
elaborates perceptual and conceptual forms of organization and advocates 
pushing each to its limits in order to encounter the outside that can trans-
form both. All three assume a form of the mind/body split that can and 
should be continually bridged in an integrative practice.9 I have, somewhat 
crudely, referred to two levels of human subjectivity as the corporeal and 
conceptual levels in order to characterize the dualism with which we live. 
Although I will discuss these two levels at times as if they were nonprob-
lematically distinct, they not only are theorized quite differendy by differ-
ent theorists but also are inextricably linked. My characterizations of Iri-
garay's and Deleuze's work should make clear just how problematic and 
ultimately arbitrary any distinction between the two must be. Although 
Irigaray's and Deleuze's approaches may suggest different ways of under-
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standing the distinction and relationship between body and mind, both 
nevertheless advocate a way of thinking and being that would explore the 
connections between the two in the context of encountering what lies be-
yond both. 
The French poststructuralism that emerged in the wake of and in re-
sponse to phenomenology and existentialism looked for the affective roots 
of language and held out hope that cultural politics, and in particular 
avantgarde literature, could achieve what Marxism could not: a shift in 
consciousness that would lead to significant social change. This French 
line of thought suggests that language does not simply describe human re-
ality but is an important constitutive factor in conscious experience.10 
Stylistic innovations can be crucial to introducing new ways of thinking 
and being that can transform our awareness. In the work of Irigaray and 
Deleuze, the concern with style becomes accountable to a reality that lies 
beyond the perceivable, conceivable reality of conventional conscious ex-
perience. Innovations in style respond to what lies beyond the familiar. It 
is only insofar as such innovations emerge from "authentic" encounters 
that they speak to something of genuine significance rather than simply 
engage in empty play. Philosophy for both becomes not simply a form of 
communication but a practice that asks basic questions about life and real-
ity and breaks down dualisms in order to intensify the experience of living 
and bring us back in touch with what most strongly moves us. 
For Irigaray and Deleuze, writing theory is a practice that brings- or 
should bring - the writer into more intense immediate contact with her-
self and the affective materiality of her existence, which feeds and moti-
vates her words. Writing and reading is effective insofar as it is able to in-
tensify the sense that one's experience is meaningful in a fully somatic 
sense of the word. Repeating what has already been said is not likely to in-
stigate the kind of thinking that enlivens one's sense of meaningful con-
nection with the world. It is stylistically evocative language that emerges 
from encounter with the world that can have this effect. And it is because 
of the way the unconscious fills in the gap provoked by the failure to stick 
to the letter of conventional meaning that this effect comes about. The re-
sponse to aporetic suspensions of conventional meaning can evoke somatic 
responses that adhere to corporeal rather than conceptual patterns of re-
sponse. Such responses can destabilize our physical forms as well as our 
psychic selves. This destabilization in turn can initiate fresh integration of 
corporeal and conceptual levels of subjectivity. Irigaray and Deleuze sug-
gest that confrontation with the limits of what is perceivable (through cor-
poreal logics) and what is conceivable (through the conceptual logics of 
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discursive systems of meaning) leads us to an infinite beyond both that is 
our most important resource in the rejuvenation of human life. 
Neither Irigaray nor Deleuze believes that there is something like a 
pure experience that can be unearthed and experienced once we have re-
moved the blind spots and distortions of contemporary culture. There is 
no touchstone, no ultimate base on which we can build a more veridical or 
authentic experience. There is no body that has access to a pure realm of 
sensation, and there is no transcendent realm of forms to which we can 
refer our thinking. To avoid reference to a foundational transcendent, Iri-
garay and Deleuze attempt to invent a new way of thinking and writing. 
Irigaray characterizes and critiques a masculine form of subjectivity in 
order to gesture toward an alternative form of subjectivity. This alterna-
tive form of subjectivity would produce an individual with a heightened 
state of consciousness who would be more in the present, more attuned to 
the body with its "natural" rhythms, less rigid, and more ethical by virtue 
of a heightened awareness of and flexibility toward others with all their 
differences. Her notion of a sensible transcendental indicates an immanent 
form of transcendence that could foster receptivity to difference without 
dictating the specific forms that difference should take. Deleuze too is try-
ing to promote an alternative image of thinking that would result not just 
in a different way of thinking but in a heightened state of consciousness. 
Like Irigaray, he is interested in promoting a way of living that does not 
erase or deny the multiplicity of life but instead receptively and creatively 
affirms it. The notion of the nomadic subject that he creates in tandem 
with Guattari evokes an individual who continually reinvents herself 
through ongoing attunement of the fluxes and flows of material life to 
the specific contingencies of social existence. The notion of becoming-
imperceptible implies continual confrontation with the limits of conven-
tional perceptions and conceptions of life and the invention of new modes 
of being through the pursuit of the immanent unfolding of desire. 
Irigaray and Deleuze diagnose and attempt to provide a cure for the 
cultural problems that they perceive. They offer images of subjectivity and 
thinking that incorporate aspects of the "unconscious" and assume a much 
richer kind of connectedness to our world and others than do traditional 
conceptions of the self. Their attempts to elaborate what I have called cor-
poreal logics into their account of human existence, as well as their at-
tempts to conceive of practices that could integrate corporeal and concep-
tual levels of subjectivity, make their work an ideal resource for creating a 
model of subjectivity that could overcome the mind/body dualisms that 
impoverish contemporary culture. 
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Developing an embodied theory of subjectivity will turn out to require 
developing a theoretical method that encourages a self-transformative 
process on the part of the theorist. Theorizing embodiment involves re-
thinking not only who we are but also how we think about who we are. 
And since this integrates into the thinking process aspects of being 
human that have often been pushed to one side, at least in the Western 
tradition of philosophical thought, it stands to reason that the how of this 
thinking should be as radically affected as the what of that thinking in the 
process. 
My perspective here is ultimately a feminist one, with all the benefits 
and limitations that such a perspective implies. Although I have tried to be 
sensitive to other kinds of embodied differences, and although I believe 
that an image of thinking premised on a logic of difference rather than a 
logic of identity would be beneficial for other kinds of differences, for the 
purposes of this project I have been especially interested in considering 
the gender inflections that emerge as one explores and experiments with 
the dissonances and resonances between Irigaray and Deleuze. I believe 
that the specular economy elaborated by Irigaray with respect to mascu-
line subjects and feminine others, however, could also be elaborated with 
respect to active subjects and supportive others who are divided across 
axes of difference other than that of gender. 
The impetus for this project is the desire to work toward a social reality 
in which the participation of all human beings would be fully supported 
and recognized. The way we think about how human beings come to be 
and maintain social selves has important repercussions for questions about 
what constitutes an ethical social order. Shifts in consciousness and social 
practices on the part of specific groups of people cannot help but affect the 
social field as a whole. Such shifts can cause disruption, dislocation, and 
disorienting rifts in social meaning. A theory of embodied subjectivity can 
help us map corporeal connections among people and thus indicate how 
different forms of subjectivity are interdependent and mutually informing. 
Challenging traditional boundaries among bodies and among minds as 
well as between bodies and minds allows us to rethink the interdependent 
nature of subjectivity. Insight into how cultural practices and discursive 
systems of meaning inform subjectivity could suggest strategies for facili-
tating constructive change. For Deleuze and Irigaray, thinking, speaking, 
and writing, if done creatively, can transform us not only at the conceptual 
level but at the level of corporeal morphology as well. Insofar as we are 
able to engage in a practice of thinking, speaking, and writing that over-
comes the mind/body split, we will be able to break out of forms of life 
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that have already been lived and thought and to invent new forms of life 
more suitable to our present circumstances. 
Irigaray not only lays out a theory of masculine subjectivity with its spec-
ular, feminine other, she also seeds her entire corpus with hints of an alter-
native feminine subjectivity- one that eludes the masculine perspective 
as well as one that has not yet, perhaps, been achieved. In fact, the category 
of the "feminine" is neither straightforward nor unitary for Irigaray. In ad-
dition to depicting the feminine other as seen by the masculine subject, 
Irigaray depicts the feminine other co-opted by masculine subjectivity 
(that is, the feminine other who buys into the way the masculine subject 
views her), the feminine other of the masculine subject as she is apart from 
the masculine subject's perspective, and the feminine other in the process 
of articulating herself as a subject and thus providing an alternative para-
digm for subjectivity that may not yet be actualized. In Chapter 1, I lay out 
Irigaray's project and give an overview of these various conceptions of the 
feminine. 
In Chapter 2 I explore Irigaray's attempted dialogue with Nietzsche in 
Marine Lover. At the same time that Irigaray is clearly drawn to Nietzsche's 
"deconstruction" of sense experience which inevitably also challenges the 
subject of that experience, she also chides him for not going far enough. If 
anyone should have succeeded in evoking the body, one might think that it 
would be Nietzsche. After all, he advocates being true to the earth and 
speaking honesdy of the body, and he paved the way for just the kind of 
challenge to traditional conceptions of the subject that Irigaray herself 
would seem to want. Yet in much of Marine Lover she derides him for his 
blind spot when it comes to the feminine other. Irigaray "argues" that de-
spite his acknowledgment of how the category of the feminine works vis-a-
vis the masculine subject, he is no closer than other masculine subjects to 
being able to conceive of the feminine subject apart from the masculine 
economy. For Irigaray, this blind spot ultimately leads him to a somata-
phobia siinilar to that which haunts masculine subjects less inclined toward 
taking the first approach to articulating the feminine. By enacting the role 
of the feminine other emerging from Nietzsche's texts in an attempted di-
alogue with Nietzsche, Irigaray gives a voice to his feminine other. With 
an examination of Marine Lover, I investigate the possibility of shattering 
mirrors by enabling the mirror to speak, and I explore Irigaray's elabora-
tion of Nietzsche's feminine other at the threshold of claiming her subjec-
tivity. 
In Chapter 3 I examine Irigaray's notion of the "sensible transcenden-
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tal" - a realm that can never be captured in language and yet with which 
we are always in direct contact- through a reading of "La Mysterique" 
(a section on medieval mystics in Speculum), her evocation of intrauterine 
experience in An Ethics of Sexual Difference, and her depiction of angels of 
passage and a feminine divine in Sexes and Genealogies. In living toward the 
horizon of the sensible transcendental, one dissolves one's perceptions and 
self-same-identity. For Irigaray, however, such dissolution is contained 
through attentive response to that which is always contiguous to conscious 
awareness; by attending to the gap between corporeal and conceptual log-
ics, especially in relation to an embodied other, one can find the point of 
contact that can lead to rejuvenating transformations of both. 
In Chapter 4 I address Irigaray's proposal for shattering mirrors as it 
emerges in Sexes and Genealogies and I Love to You. Irigaray insists on get-
ting the masculine subject to acknowledge the feminine other in her push 
toward a new kind of subject in part because implicit forms of feminine 
subjectivity are, according to Irigaray, our best bet for rejuvenating cul-
ture. Since the masculine economy of subjectivity requires feminine oth-
ers, empowering women by fostering their active subjectivity (according 
to the masculine model) not only is impractical but also would obliterate 
an alternative economy of subjectivity that already exists in nascent form. 
It is dialogue between two different subjects that could usher in a new, 
more ethical way of life. 
I then turn to Deleuze. Although Heidegger was not operating out of a 
psychoanalytic framework, his influence on the Lacanian reading of Freud 
which influences Irigaray's work is clear. Deleuze, like Irigaray, · albeit 
from a different perspective, challenges this tradition and investigates cer-
tain philosophers who are "deviant" in one way or another in order to cre-
ate a conception of thinking, speaking, and writing that evokes the body in 
a way that moves beyond a psychoanalytic framework. He contrasts the 
traditional image of philosophical thought (which he argues is so limiting 
as to kill genuine thinking entirely) and creates his own conceptions of no-
madic thinking, speaking, and writing that do not just provide an alterna-
tive to the traditional ones but create an alternative conception of subjec-
tivity in the process. In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari contest the 
Lacanian account of (masculine) subjectivity and develop a model in 
which molecular flows stabilize into the molar aggregates of human sub-
jects with recognizable bodies and selves. They advocate a project of 
schizoanalysis that would thwart social hegemony and foster experiments 
in nomadic living. In other works by Deleuze, and Deleuze and Guattari, 
these experiments go by the names of "becoming-imperceptible" and even 
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"doing philosophy'' (among others). In Chapter 5 I discuss the model of 
subjectivity Deleuze and Guattari present in Anti-Oedipus, give a prelimi-
nary sketch of their conceptions of becoming-imperceptible and philoso-
phy, and explore these experiments as projects in symbolizing viable alter-
native models of subjectivity. 
In Chapter 6 I present Deleuze's version of Nietzsche. The main differ-
ence in Irigaray's and Deleuze's readings of Nietzsche has to do with 
Nietzsche's notion of the eternal return. Irigaray insists that Nietzsche's 
eternal return involves a notion of the repetition of the same. Because of 
his failure to acknowledge the creative contribution to becoming made by 
the feminine, he can never enter into a real relationship with the feminine 
other upon whom his identity depends. Deleuze, by contrast, insists that 
Nietzsche's notion of the eternal return is not about the repetition of the 
same, but rather involves a repetition of difference which is ultimately 
based on a logic of difference rather than a logic of identity. The 
Dionysian subject of the eternal return has no need of affirming a self-
identical self and is instead engaged in an ongoing process of metamor-
phosis. This audacious experiment in subjectivity, however, entails the dis-
solution of personal identity. Comparing the two conceptions of the 
eternal return brings out the dilemma of stabilizing a self out of dynamic 
processes ofbecoming. 
In Chapter 7 I elaborate on the model of subjectivity Deleuze and 
Guattari develop in Anti-Oedipus by extending this model to include the 
model presented in their book A Thousand Plateaus. In the latter work, 
desiring-machines become assemblages and schizoanalysis becomes de-
stratification. Their conceptual innovations enrich their initial model and 
provide a vocabulary for nomadic experiments which resonates in interest-
ing ways with Irigaray's very different presentation of feminine experi-
ments in subjectivity. I further draw out these resonances by exploring the 
trajectory of becoming-minority (as it emerges in Deleuze and Guattari's 
book Kafka), becoming-woman, and becoming-imperceptible, and the no-
tions of a line of flight and the body without organs. 
In Chapter 8 I appeal to Deleuze's reading of Foucault to highlight how 
destratification can be a practice that integrates corporeal and conceptual 
logics, and I suggest that the notion of a Foucauldian 'diagram' (or the 
construction of an 'abstract machine' as described by Deleuze and Guat-
tari in A Thousand Plateaus) can provide a useful tool for putting individual 
projects of destratification into the context of a larger social field in which 
we may want to select certain lines of flight rather than others. In addition, 
I suggest that Irigaray's work could be read as a diagram of sexual differ-
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ence, and I advocate multiple mappings of the social field. I then give a 
reading of Deleuze and Guattari's notions of philosophy and art as it 
emerges in What Is Philosophy? in order to develop further their notion of 
the virtual as the counterpart to Irigaray's notion of a feminine divine. Iri-
garay insists on the receptivity to the divine of a living subject in continual 
contact with embodied others in a sensual world; Deleuze and Guattari lay 
out approaches to the virtual that may provide new perspectives on such 
living. 
In Chapter 9 I attempt a synthesis of Irigaray and Deleuze. Irigaray's 
conception of the sensible transcendental and Deleuze's conception of 
becoming-imperceptible entail a critique of traditional notions of percep-
tion and representation as well as of the subject. These critiques are devel-
oped in tandem with new theories of subjectivity that symbolize the pro-
cess of challenging conventional norms of perception and conception 
which subjects must continually undergo in order to integrate the dynamic 
becoming of life. Both theorists suggest that there is a realm of the infinite 
that is immanent in our sense perception - an inexhaustible realm that is 
"outside" our ordinary experience and yet always there at the edges of our 
feeling, thought, and perception. I consider the dilemmas raised for per-
sonal identity by the receptivity to dynamic becoming advocated by Iri-
garay and Deleuze, and I suggest ways to combine Irigaray's concern for 
personal identity with Deleuze's detailed account of the pre-personal sin-
gularities of life processes. At the same time that Deleuze acknowledges 
that others are always implicated in our flights, he does not insist on recog-
nition of the feminine other in the way that Irigaray does. And at the same 
time that Irigaray insists on the feminine other, she does not allow, per-
haps, the same range of lines of flight as Deleuze. Reading the two to-
gether opens up new ways of thinking about subjectivity, self-other rela-
tions, and mind/body dualisms. 
I~UiiiD 19 
This content downloaded from 
             130.58.64.51 on Wed, 23 Jun 2021 14:22:59 UTC               
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
